Crawford, Michael v. Washington

Questions presented: (1) Whether the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment permits the admission against a criminal defendant of a custodial statement by a potential accomplice on the ground that parts of the statement "interlock" with the defendant's custodial statement? (2) Whether the Confrontation Clause framework established in Ohio v. Roberts. 448 U.S. 56 (1980) should be reevaluated and read to unequivocally prohibit the admission of out-of-court statements insofar as they are contained in "testimonial" materials, such as tape-recorded custodial statements.

BY DARRAN SIMON, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On Aug. 5, 1999, Michael Crawford stabbed and injured Rubin Richard Kenneth Lee, an acquaintance, after a heated argument in Lees apartment. Crawford and his wife, Sylvia, had gone to the Lees apartment at her urging, and Sylvia witnessed the stabbing.

The couple told similar stories of the evening after police questioned them. Both said the three had been at Lees apartment, but Crawford left for a brief moment. He came back to find Lee making sexual advances to his wife. So an angry Crawford stabbed Lee.

However, the Crawfords recanted parts of their story after police questioned them individually hours later. Both admitted on tape that Lees sexual assault of Sylvia happened weeks ago. Michael Crawford became angry at the mention of Lees name and went to his apartment that evening, the couple said. Crawford said when he stabbed Lee after an argument in self-defense, Lee had something in his hand. Sylvia's admission differed slightly from her husbands recollection. She said Lee reached for something after Crawford stabbed him. She told police that her husband had been "enraged" and "past tipsy."

At trial on deadly weapons charges of attempted first degree murder and first degree assault, Crawford claimed that he acted in self-defense and invoked the marital privilege to prevent his wife Sylvie from testifying. The marital privilege bars a husband from testifying against his wife and vice-versa, during and after the marriage.

Police admitted Sylvia's second police statement into the record at trial, although she never testified against her husband. Sylvia didnt take the stand, but her out-of-court statements helped convict her husband in November 1999 of first degree assault with a deadly weapon.

Crawford, now 25, is four years into a 15-year sentence in a Washington prison. He appealed his conviction, arguing that his 6th Amendment right to confrontation was violated when his wifes hearsay statements were admitted in trial.

The confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment guarantees an accused the right to a face-to-face confrontation with a witness against them in court. The clause is intended to control the admission of out-of-court hearsay statements by witnesses and co-defendants into the court record.

Usually out of court statements of non-testifying accomplices are not admitted in trial, unless they fall within a framework established by Ohio v. Roberts, a 20-year-old U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Ohio v. Roberts said that an out-of-court statement can be admitted into evidence if a court concludes that the statement is reliable or firmly rooted in an exception to the hearsay rule, such as dying declarations and excited utterances. Courts have established tests to determine whether out-of-court statements from non-testifying accomplices fit into that framework.

In reversing Crawford's conviction, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled that Sylvia's statements were unreliable and should not have been admitted. She had reason to lie and gave two different stories within a few hours, the court ruled in an unpublished, yet divided opinion. The court said Crawford did not waive his right to confrontation. The appeals court used a premise set in State v. Rice in which the Washington Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that an accomplices confession is reliable if it is in sync with a defendants confession. Sylvia was a potential accomplice in the assault case against her husband. She pleaded guilty in January 2000 to first-degree rendering criminal assistance and third-degree assault.

On Sept. 25, 2002, the Washington Supreme Court reinstated Crawford's conviction. Though the state supreme court ruled that Crawford had not waived his right to confrontation when he invoked the marital privilege, Sylvia's second statement was similar to her husbands confession and therefore reliable enough to be admitted into evidence.

On June 9, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case and allowed Crawford to have his case considered without costs.

Steven C. Sherman, a Thurston County prosecutor who argued the case before the Washington Supreme Court, said he hopes the Court establishes strict guidelines of what can be accepted short of actual confrontation.

"This is a case that is eventually going to have ramifications on virtually every criminal case in every state, territory and jurisdiction of the United States simply because it relates to a central right, that being confrontation," he said.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, a Washington attorney representing Crawford before the Court, argues that the Washington Supreme Courts opinion conflicts with Supreme Court precedents in Idaho v. Wright and Lilly v. Virginia. The two cases rejected using the similarity of an accomplices out-of-court statements to that of a defendants statements as a basis for admission. However, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois ruled in 1986 that the similarity between an accomplices out of court statement and a defendants statement was sufficient to establish the statementsworthiness.

In addition state and federal courts have been split on whether an accomplices out of court statement can be admissible in court on the basis that it is in sync or "interlocks" with a defendants confession, Fisher argues. The Supreme Court can resolve this conflict, which is a "critical issue" in criminal trials across the nation, he said.

The state of Washington acknowledges the split among some of the nations state and federal courts, but argues that it is not a critical issue. Neither does it warrant that the Supreme Court reevaluate the framework established in Ohio v. Roberts, they say.

Fisher suggests an approach favored by Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia in which the Court should only accept the face-to-face confrontation and testimony of witnesses. Therefore it would not matter how in sync a co-defendants statements are or whether it falls within the Roberts framework.

"Adopting the testimonial approach would terminate this constitutional anomaly and return the Confrontation Clause to its proper place in the realm of criminal procedure," Fisher argues.

University of Michigan law professor Richard D. Friedman, whose research focuses on evidence, said he plans to file an amicus in support of Crawford.

Friedman said he has advocated a similar testimonial approach for the past 7-8 years. He said the fact the Supreme Court took the case indicates that the Court is "willing to consider that their rules dont work and that they dont express what the Confrontation Clause is meant to do."

But Case Western Reserve Professor Paul Giannelli says he doesnt see the Supreme Court replacing the Roberts framework.

"That is a tremendous burden on the prosecution," he said. "It would be an important case if the Court rejects Roberts and uses some other analysis."

Giannelli said that for almost a quarter century, the Supreme Court has adhered to the Roberts framework. He said the Roberts framework seemed like a "very stringent test" when it was established but sometimes courts are very lax with admitted evidence that is rooted in a hearsay exception.

The Thurston County Prosecutors Office said the situation is not as dire as Crawford implies and his case is straightforward. Using the premise of the Washington Supreme Court opinion in State v. Rice case and U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Lee v. Illinois, Sylvias comments were significant because they were identical with very little discrepancy.

"How much more reliable can evidence be ... if it is identical to what the defendant confessed to," said Sherman, who added that the Roberts premise works.

"I dont think the system needs revamping," he said.

On March 8, 2004, the Court held 9-0 for Crawford that use of Sylvia's statement violated the Confrontation Clause because, where testimonial statements are at issue, actual confrontation is needed to satisfy the constitution.

In so holding, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the Court's 1980 opinion in Roberts, referring to it as unpredictable and inconsistently applied. Chief Justice William Rehnquist penned a concurrence that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined, in which they diverged from the majority's decision to abandon Roberts.