Carr v. U.S.
Justices will hear case on retroactivity of sex offender act (Sept. 30, 2009)
The Supreme Court has agreed to determine whether it was unconstitutional for the Attorney General to apply the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act retroactively to an individual whose underlying crime occurred before the law was enacted by Congress.
Under the 2006 law, states must set up centralized computer banks to track people convicted of sex crimes and post detailed information about each of them, along with a photograph, on a Web site that anyone can access.
In 2004, Thomas Carr pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in Alabama. Upon his release from prison, he was complied with the state's requirement that he register as a sex offender.
He later moved to Indiana and was arrested there on unrelated charges on July 2007. Carr was charged under SORNA and sentenced to 37 months in prison. He appealed, arguing that prosecutors should not have used a law that wasn't in existence when he committed his crime.
But the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected his ex post facto claim and affirmed his conviction, reasoning that that the ex post facto clause is not violated "as long as at least one of the acts" that is "required for punishment" occurred after "the criminal statute punishing the acts takes effect."
The ruling set up a circuit split with other courts ruling that SORNA cannot be applied retroactively.
On Sept. 30, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
The court has also accepted another sex offender case, U.S. v. Comstock, testing the constitutionality of continued imprisonment of a sex offender considered to be dangerous after that individual has completed serving a prison sentence for the crimes.
Question presented: Whether a person may be criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 for failure to register when the defendant’s underlying offense and travel in interstate commerce both predated the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s enactment ; whether the Ex Post Facto Clause precludes prosecution under § 2250(a) of a person whose underlying offense and travel in interstate commerce both predated SORNA’s enactment.