Bloate v. U.S.

The Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether time granted to prepare pretrial motions is excludable in calculating the 70 days from indictment or first appearance for bringing a defendant to trial.

In August 2006, Taylor James Bloate was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The indictment triggered the start of the 70-day pretrial period mandated under the Speedy Trial Act. On Sept. 7, 2006, Bloate moved for and was granted an extension of the deadline for filing pretrial motions. On Oct. 4, 2006, a magistrate judge granted petitioner leave to waive the right to file pretrial motions.

On Feb.19, 2007, Bloate filed a motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy
Trial Act. App. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the motion. It held that the Speedy Trial Act had not been violated because several periods of time were properly excludable from the 70-day period prescribed by the Act

The court held that the 28 days allocated to the preparation of pretrial motions--from
Sept. 7, 2006, to Oct. 4, 2006--were automatically excludable.

In March 2007, the district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. Bloate appealed, asserting a Speedy Trial Act violation and other trial and sentencing errors

In July 2008, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed but noted that the circuits are divided as to whether pretrial motion preparation time is excludable.

On April 20, the Supreme Court accepted review. Oral arguments will be held during the fall term beginning Oct. 5, 2009.

Question presented: Whether time granted at the request of a defendant to prepare pretrial motions qualifies as “delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant” and is thus excludable from the time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.

The Supreme Court ruled today that time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable in calculating the 70 days from indictment or first appearance for bringing a defendant to trial.

In August 2006, Taylor James Bloate was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.

The indictment triggered the start of the 70-day pretrial period mandated under the Speedy Trial Act. On Sept. 7, 2006, Bloate moved for and was granted an extension of the deadline for filing pretrial motions. On Oct. 4, 2006, a magistrate judge granted petitioner leave to waive the right to file pretrial motions.

On Feb.19, 2007, Bloate filed a motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied the motion. It held that the Speedy Trial Act had not been violated because several periods of time were properly excludable from the 70-day period prescribed by the Act

The court held that the 28 days allocated to the preparation of pretrial motions--from Sept. 7, 2006, to Oct. 4, 2006--were automatically excludable.

In March 2007, the district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. Bloate appealed, asserting a Speedy Trial Act violation and other trial and sentencing errors

In July 2008, a three-judge panel on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed but noted that the circuits are divided as to whether pretrial motion preparation time is excludable.

On March 8, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the lower court decision in a 7-2 vote.

"This case requires us to decide the narrow question whether time granted to a party to prepare pretrial motions is automatically excludable from the Act's 70-day limit under subsection (h)(1), or whether such time may be excluded only if a court makes case-specific findings under subsection (h)(7). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that pretrial motion preparation time is automatically excludable under subsection (h)(1). We granted certiorari and now reverse," Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority.

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined the majority opinion but filed a separate concurrence.

Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, dissented.

Question presented: Whether time granted at the request of a defendant to prepare pretrial motions qualifies as “delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant” and is thus excludable from the time within which trial must commence under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 3161 et seq.