Lawrence, Gary v. Florida (02/20/2007)

Questions presented: (1) Whether the one-year statute of limitations period of the Antiterro rism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) denies habeas relief? (2) Does the confusion around the statute of limitations -- as evidenced by the split in the circuits -- constitute an "extraordinary circumstance," entitling a defendant to equitable tolling during the time when his claim is being considered by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari?

BY AMY HELD, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

Congress established the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996 after the Oklahoma City bombings, in part to fund anti-terrorism efforts but also with an eye on victims' rights in limiting the appeals process open to death-row inmates.

The Act significantly hampers death row inmates' ability to apply for habeas relief, a written petition stating the prisoner has been wrongly imprisoned.

The AEDPA bars federal courts from considering any petition for habeas corpus unless the state court has "unreasonably" interpreted some portion of the constitution in finding the prisoner guilty.

The Act seeks to ensure "justice for victims and an effective death penalty," according to the text of the bill. It carries a one-year statute of limitations on habeas appeals in federal court.

Eleven years after his murder conviction and on his third try, Gary Lawrence, a Florida man, will have his case heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on the statute of limitations question.

On July 28, 1994, Lawrence bludgeoned Michael Finken to death with a pipe and baseball bat before setting his body ablaze in Santa Rosa County, Florida.

Lawrence was seeking revenge on the sleeping man for having an affair with his estranged wife. Lawrence's two young daughters witnessed the gruesome murder.

A jury convicted Lawrence of first-degree murder in March 1995 and recommended the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the sentence in August 1997.

After unsuccessfully appealing his sentence twice, on March 11, 2003, Lawrence sought habeas relief in federal court, but lawyers for the state argued that his claim should be dismissed because he had already exceeded the time limit on both his original and amended petition based on the AEDPA provision.

Lawrence argued that equitable tolling, or a suspension of the petition's time limitation, should apply in his case because his state-appointed counsel decided when to file the petition. Lawrence said that even though he exceeded the time limit in the AEDPA, the state itself should be held accountable.

Not only did Lawrence argue that his attorney, John Miller, did not meet his duties as effective counsel but their relationship was also encumbered by the convicted murderer's mental deficiencies which prevented him from fully communicating with Miller.

On May 27, 2004, the district court noted that Lawrence's petition for habeas relief was indeed invalidated by exceeded the allotted time but issued him a certificate of appealability. Lawrence appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals.

On Aug. 26, 2005, the 11th Circuit said it only grants equitable tolling for "extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond (petitioner's) control and unavoidable even with diligence." According to the court, Lawrence did not meet these criteria, despite his assertion that the state granted him an incompetent attorney.

The 11th Circuit stated that Lawrence could demonstrate no causal relationship between his mental shortcomings and his ability to file a timely petition, and thus his claim was invalidated. The appeals court stated further that the district court was wrong to grant him a certificate of appealability, but acknowledged a disparity among the federal circuits in how the time limit is applied.

Lawrence appealed and on March 27, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case for review and allowed Lawrence to have his case heard without cost.

One of the issues to be considered by the Court is from what date, exactly, the one-year statute of limitations for death penalty appeals should derive. The Court is being asked to decide whether it should begin when the court of appeals affirms the District Court's conviction and sentence, or from the deadline for filing a petition with the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Act allows for one year for federal appeals and any additional time the case may be pending on state post conviction review, but Lawrence is asking the Supreme Court to decide whether this means only the time pending in state court or includes the time the convicted murderer asked the Supreme Court to take the case, according to Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director of the California-based Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.

Scheidegger said that before the Act's introduction in 1996 the appeals process took about 12 years from the time of sentencing to execution and that the process still takes about 12 years today. He said, however, that the appeals process was "steadily increasing" before the Act took effect, so at the least it has stopped the process from becoming ever-lengthier.

The Act states that this "reform will help avoid the waste of state and federal resources that now result when a prisoner presenting a hopeless petition to a federal court is sent back to the state courts to exhaust state remedies."

"As a whole the act has caused the time to level off and stop increasing but has not decreased as much as proponents would like," Scheidegger said.

On Feb. 20, 2007, a divided Court sided with Florida, holding 5-4 that section 2244(d)(2) does not toll the 1-year limitations period during the pendency of a Supreme Court certiorari petition.

Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that assuming that "2244(d)(2) allows for equitable tolling, Lawrence fell far short of showing the "extraordinary circumstances," needed to support equitable tolling of his otherwise untimely claims.

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer dissented.