Bradshaw, Margaret (Warden) v. Stumpf, John (06/13/2005)

Questions presented: (1) Is a representation on the record from defendant's counsel and/or the defendant that counsel has explained the elements of the charge to the defendant, sufficient to show the voluntariness of the guilty plea under Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976)? (2) Does the Due Process Clause require that a defendant's guilty plea be vacated when the state subsequently prosecutes another person in connection with the crime and allegedly presents evidence at the second defendant's trial that is inconsistent with the first defendant's guilt?

BY HEATHER GILLERS, MEDILL NEWS SERVICE

On the night of May 14, 1984, John Stumpf and Clyde Wesley knocked on the door of a Guernsey County, Ohio, house and asked to use the phone. They were armed and possibly drunk. They'd been at a bar beforehand. After they got inside, Stumpf and Wesley pulled out guns and declared their true intentions. Stumpf held the inhabitants, Norman and Mary Jane Stout, at gunpoint while Wesley poked around the house for valuables. Stumpf was not a lenient captor. When Norman Stout tried to escape, Stumpf shot the man twice in the head.

According to Ohio courts, those facts are clear. What happened next is not.

Mary Jane Stout was murdered before Stumpf and Wesley left that night. Norman Stout, who survived, heard the four shots that killed her but did not see who fired them.

Both Stumpf and Wesley are behind bars for killing Mary Jane Stout.

Stumpf pleaded guilty to aggravated murder. The evidence against him seemed damning. After all, the bullet that killed Mary Jane Stout came from Stumpf's gun, the one he had used to shoot her husband. Plus, whether or not he had pulled the trigger on Mrs. Stout, Stumpf's actions had certainly led to her death. With his plea, Stumpf entered a statement that he had shot only Norman Stout, but a three-judge panel didn't buy it: In September 1984, the panel sentenced Stumpf to death.

But several months later, in a separate trial, a jury convicted Wesley of killing Mary Jane Stout. The evidence against Wesley was compelling, too. The prosecutor – the same one at Stumpf's plea hearing – showed that Wesley had confessed to the murder while awaiting trial in prison. The prosecutor questioned Wesley's cellmate, James Eastman, who repeated Wesley's account of the May night:

After Stumpf shot Norman Stout for the second time, Eastman recounted, Stumpf had dropped his gun and fled. Wesley picked up Stumpf's gun and finished the job.

The jury sentenced Wesley to life in prison, of which he has already served 20 years. A parole board will decide this year whether he is eligible for parole.

With their client condemned to die for a crime that courts had pinned on his buddy, Stumpf's lawyers argued on five separate occasions in state and federal court that Stumpf deserved a new trial. They made the case that Stumpf's conviction violated his constitutional rights. But every time, the courts declined. They ruled that Stumpf's conviction had been proper, and did not merit a new trial. But they did recommend that other courts continue to consider taking the case.

Finally, a 6th Circuit Court of Appeals panel agreed to look at Stumpf's case. Two questions plagued the appeals court:

First, the panel wondered, had Stumpf meant to plead guilty?

The trial transcript was troubling. When asked if he wanted to plead guilty to aggravated murder, Stumpf, a man found to have a low IQ, had turned repeatedly to his lawyer. Stumpf wanted to know if he could still argue, after entering a guilty plea, that he hadn't shot Mary Jane Stout.

Stumpf could still argue that – to the three-judge panel chosen to sentence him – and his lawyer told him so. But he could no longer argue that he was not guilty in Mrs. Stout's murder.

The exchange between Stumpf and his lawyer, concluded the 6th Circuit majority, had "all the hallmarks of a serious misunderstanding."

Stumpf's lawyer had promised a sentencing hearing. Stumpf had expected a trial.

He may also have misunderstood the charge against him, the majority decided. Stumpf's version of events did not jibe with the state's definition of aggravated murder. Reading through the transcript of Stumpf's trial, the majority found that "he continued to maintain throughout the proceeding that he had not been the one who actually shot the victim."

Even if he hadn't pulled the trigger on Mary Jane Stout, Stumpf could be found guilty of killing her. After all, he had planned and executed an armed robbery of her house and killed her husband. But Stumpf didn't just plead guilty to murder in Mrs. Stout's death, he plead guilty to aggravated murder. To commit aggravated murder, in Ohio in 1984, you had not only to kill a person but also to intend to kill that person

If Stumpf hadn't pulled the trigger, why would he have chosen to plead guilty to the more serious – and more cold-blooded – charge?

Maybe, concluded the majority, Stumpf hadn't knowingly chosen to enter a plea at all. That alone could entitle Stumpf to a new trial.

So could the second question that plagued the appeals court: What about Clyde Wesley?

Even if Stumpf had meant to plead guilty, could the state continue to punish him for a crime for which it had convicted his accomplice?

After all, the Bill of Rights promised that Stumpf wouldn't be condemned to prison or death without "due process of law." Wasn't a new trial after the state convicted Wesley part of the process due Stumpf?

The majority decided it was and ordered a new trial.

"Stumpf clearly has a due process claim," concluded Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey for the majority. "Because inconsistent theories [in this case, of Mrs. Stout's murder] render convictions unreliable, they constitute a violation of the due process rights of any defendant in whose trial they are used."

Chief Judge Danny J. Boggs dissented. The state had learned about Wesley's jail cell confession after Stumpf was sentenced, Boggs pointed out. Prosecutors had entertained no "inconsistent theories" during Stumpf's trial. The state had not violated Stumpf's right to due process. It had simply used evidence obtained later to make a different argument.

"No one but Wesley and Stumpf know[s] who shot Mrs. Stout," Boggs wrote.

Boggs also didn't buy Stumpf's argument that he hadn't wanted to plead guilty. For someone in Stumpf's position, Boggs pointed out, pleading guilty made strategic sense. The three-judge panel at Boggs' plea hearing chose to sentence him to death, but had the option to give him life in prison, with the possibility of parole in 20 or 30 years. Accepting responsibility for Mrs. Stout's murder upped the chances that Stout would get a more lenient sentence.

When Stumpf plead guilty, according to Boggs, he "got exactly the opportunities he bargained for."

In seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court, the state of Ohio argued that no federal court has ever said before that once the state convicts a suspect of a crime, it owes a new trial to anyone sentenced for that same crime.

Nor has any court satisfactorily decided how to make sure a guilty plea is intentional, Ohio argued. For some, the defense lawyer's say so, combined with the prosecutor's argument that the defendant could have committed the crime, is sufficient. But other courts, including the 6th Circuit, have suggested the state must prove that a defendant wants to plead guilty. If it can't prove that, he or she deserves a new trial.

On Jan. 7, 2005, the Supreme Court accepted review in the case and allowed Stumpf to have the case heard without cost.

If the Court rules in Stumpf's favor, said Ohio State Solicitor Douglas Cole, "it might have the effect of upsetting a lot of settled pleas."

On June 13, 2005, the Court saw no need to upset any pleas, holding unanimously that Stumpf was informed sufficiently of the elements of his crime. The Court's opinion, written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, also found that prosecution's inconsistent theories did not require that Stumpf's guilty plea be voided. However, on that point, the Court remanded the case to the 6th Circuit to determine if the prosecution's conduct related to Stumpf's death sentence.